VENTURA SUPERIOR COURT FILE (1)

NFC 0 8 2008

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Attorneys for Brandon McInerney

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF

BRANDON MCINERNEY

Plaintiff.

Defendant

CALIFORNIA

VS.

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA

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Case No.: 2008005782

Department No. 14
Hearing Date: 12/29/18

Time: 8:30

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR DEFENDANT'S FORMAL DISCOVERY ORDER

TO: GREGORY TOTTEN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR VENTURA COUNTY

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on 12/29/08, at 8 30, or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department of the above entitled court, defendant, Brandon McInerney, by and through attorneys, Robyn Bramson, Scott Wippert, Josh

Solberg and Summer Mckeivier will move the court for a discovery order directing the People of the State of California to provide the requested discovery.

This motion is made pursuant to California Penal Code sections 1054.1 and 1054.5(b), relevant case law, and the due process provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of California.

The motion for defendant's discovery order will be based on this notice of motion, the memorandum of points and authorities, the declaration of defense counsel, all papers and records on file in this action, and such other and further oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on this motion.

Defendant respectfully requests production and disclosure or the right to examine, inspect, copy, photograph, or make other facsimile copies of the following materials and information that are within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor; the existence which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known:

- 1. Any and all notes, communications, correspondence, internal memoranda and other material relating to internal standards or guidelines, whether or not previously reduced to writing, used or referenced by the Ventura County District Attorney to determine which cases involving minors to direct-file in criminal court.
- 2. Any and all materials related to training given to employees of the Ventura County District Attorney regarding standards for direct-filing cases involving minors in criminal court.

- 3. Any and all notes, communications, correspondence, internal memoranda and other materials, whether or not previously reduced to writing, relating to the District Attorney's decision to direct-file this case in criminal court.
- 4. The names and contact information of any and all persons consulted regarding the decision to direct-file this case, and other cases involving minors in Ventura County, in criminal court.
- 5. Any and all notes or summaries of conversations, whether or not previously reduced to writing, relating to the decision to direct file this case and other cases involving minors in Ventura County in criminal court.
- 6. Statistics since March 8, 2000 (Date that Proposition 21 went into effect) relating to the percentage of cases involving minors charged with crimes that could potentially be filed in criminal court, which in fact resulted in being direct-filed in criminal court.
- 7. Case names and case numbers of all direct-filed cases since March 8, 2000 (Date that Proposition 21 went into effect).
 - 8. All materials as defined by Penal Code section 1054.1.

This motion is made on the basis that all information and materials sought constitute or contain evidence material and relevant to the issues and subject matter of this case and are necessary and material to the defense of this case without which the defendant would be denied the effective assistance of counsel and due process of law

. The defendant made an informal discovery requests on October 28, 2008. A Copy of the informal discovery request is attached hereto and incorporated as if fully set forth as Exhibit "A". The prosecution has failed to provide the requested information.

DATED: December 3, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

Robyn B. Bramson Attorney at Law

Scott S. Wippert
Attorney at Law

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12	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFO	ORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA	
13		rading Court of Vertician	
14	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	Case No.: 2008005782	
15	CALIFORNIA		
16	Plaintiff,	Department No. Hearing Date:	
17	X/G	Time:	
18	VS.	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND	
19	BRANDON MCINERNEY	AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DEFENDANT'S	
20	Defendant	FORMAL DISCOVERY ORDER	
21	INTRODUCTION		
22	Due process of law requires the appropriate to "1'-1-1-11 the '1-11 the '1-1		
23	Due process of law requires the prosecution to "divulge all evidence to the defense		
24	which is both favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or to punishment",		
25	including all information that could impeach the prosecution witnesses. (People v.		
26 27	Martinez (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1078, citing Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S.		
28	83, United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 675-76.) The process for requesting		

and obtaining discovery is governed by Penal Code section 1054 et seq. Penal Code section 1054.1 governs what materials the prosecution is required to provide to the defendant. In addition to the materials defined by section 1054.1, constitutional provisions and case law have defined the scope of additional materials not specified within section 1054.1, which should be disclosed to the defendant.

In this case, defendant, Brandon McInerney, requested specific items of discovery through informal discovery, but to date the district attorney has failed to provide those items. Without these items, defense counsel cannot competently represent Brandon, cannot sufficiently and competently prepare and present a defense, or prepare for trial. Due to the district attorney's failure to provide the requested specific items of discovery, Brandon is respectfully asking the court to order the disclosure of the requested material pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.5, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7, and article I, section 30 of the Constitution of the State of California.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 14, 2008 Maeve Fox, on behalf of the Ventura County District Attorney's office, direct-filed a complaint against minor Brandon McInerney, in the Ventura County Superior Court, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(2). The complaint alleged that on or about February 12, 2008 Brandon committed a violation of Penal Code section 664/187, as well as enhancements pursuant to Penal Code sections 12022.53(d) and 422.75(a). On January 24, 2008, 19 days before the

conduct alleged by the District Attorney, Brandon turned 14 years old. Thereafter, Ms. Fox filed an amended complaint against Brandon. This complaint was also direct-filed in the Ventura County Superior Court. This complaint alleged that Brandon committed a violation of Penal Code section 187, but otherwise mirrored the original complaint.

At the time the District Attorney filed both the original and amended complaints, Brandon had no record in the juvenile justice system.

In the approximately 10 months that have passed since the direct-filing of Brandon's case, the Ventura County District Attorney's office has made numerous statements to the media about this matter. According to the Los Angeles Times in a July 26, 2008 news article, Ventura County District Attorney Gregory Totten, "said the severity of the crime prompted him to try McInerney as an adult." (Catherine Saillant, Lawyer for Oxnard Youth accused of Killing gay classmate wants trial to begin soon, L.A. Times, July 26, 2008 (emphasis added.))

Regarding the District Attorney's direct-filing of Brandon's case, Ms. Fox reportedly indicated that, "she had been the one to file the charges against Brandon, and that she had filed them as she believed the law required her to". (Michael Mehas, 14-year-old Brandon McInerney: Ventura County's sacrificial lamb, (August 3, 2008) at http://www.stolenboy.com. (emphasis added.)) According to other media sources, Chief Assistant District Attorney James Ellison said, "[w]e believe the crime is charged appropriately." Mr. Ellison also reportedly said that his office would not disclose why they decided to charge Brandon as an adult, because that would require a

discussion of the facts of the case before the preliminary hearing. (14 year old pleads not guilty in killing of gay classmate, (August 8, 2008), at http://shrewdnessofapes.blogspot.com (emphasis added.))

Regarding the Ventura County District Attorney's direct-filing prosecutions in general, Chief Deputy District Attorney Michael K. Frawley reportedly told the Ventura County Star, "The District Attorney prosecutes juveniles in adult courts if the juveniles are accused of committing serious felonies and generally have significant records in the juvenile justice system". (Raul Hernandez, Juveniles tried as adults up 170%, Ventura County Star, February 17, 2008 (emphasis added.)) In the same article Senior Deputy District Attorney Brian Rafelson said, "If a juvenile commits one of 30 felony offenses spelled out in the law, ranging from murder to witness intimidation, the law allows prosecutors to send the case to adult court." He also said, "the district attorney takes into consideration prior criminal history and whether the crime was gang-related". (Raul Hernandez, Juveniles tried as adults up 170%, Ventura County Star, February 17, 2008 (emphasis added.))

Ms. Fox reportedly gave an extensive interview to The Advocate regarding Brandon's case. In that interview, Ms. Fox is quoted as saying,

"When you kill someone, to me you need to be incarcerated away from the public for a long time. Because to me, you've demonstrated that you're dangerous. That's why we have such lengthy sentences for murderers, because you don't want to just say, 'Now don't ever do that again!'

They're dangerous people in most cases - - unless it's some extreme case where the person was under duress - - in those cases we generally work out

some kind of plea or agreement. What I'm thinking of is battered women, people who kill under extreme circumstances.

But if it's a situation where it's unprovoked and premeditated, then I would say in pretty much all of those cases, that public safety is a tremendous concern for me. And punishment is very high on my list of priorities. I'm very big on personal responsibility. And unless you can show me that you had a really, really, really good reason for doing what you did, I think you should stand up and be accountable for it. And you should be punished..."

(Karen Ocamb, <u>Arraignment Postponed for Lawrence King's Accused Shooter</u>, (May 10-12, 2008) <u>at http://www.advocate.com/news</u> (emphasis added.))

On July 24, 2008 a hearing was held in the Ventura County Superior Court regarding a demurrer filed by the public defender's office, which at the time represented Brandon. The Demurrer in essence argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d) was unconstitutional because it violates the 8th Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore the court did not have jurisdiction over Brandon's case. According to the Ventura County Star, after the court denied Brandon's demurrer Ms. Fox said that, "[Judge] Daily's ruling on the constitutionality of the state law "pretty much" eliminated the possibility of the district attorney sending [Brandon's] case to the juvenile justice system...". (Raul Hernandez, Judge OKs adult trial for teen suspect, Ventura County Star, July 25, 2008 (emphasis added.))

The Ventura County Star also reported that, "[Ms. Fox] said that while she might feel "sympathy" toward [Brandon] because of his age, there is no legal defense for not trying him in adult court". Additionally, the same article states that in the event that the judge ruled in favor of Brandon and granted the Demurrer, "Fox said she could, hypothetically, go back and file a "lying in wait" special circumstance against

[Brandon] and by law, the case would have to be transferred back to adult court." (Raul Hernandez, <u>Judge OKs adult trial for teen suspect</u>, Ventura County Star, July 25, 2008 (emphasis added.))

LAW AND ARGUMENT

I.

PENAL CODE SECTION 1054, ET SEQ. IS NOT THE EXCLUSIVE BASIS FOR DISCOVERY IN A CRIMINAL CASE WITHIN CALIFORNIA.

Penal Code section 1054, et seq., governs discovery procedures in criminal cases within California. Section 1054, et seq., was adopted pursuant to Proposition 115, during the June 1990 primary election and became effective as of June 6, 1990. Penal Code section 1054 outlines the purposes of this chapter, indicating the following:

This chapter shall be interpreted to give effect to all of the following purposes:

- (a) To promote the ascertainment of truth in trials by requiring timely pretrial discovery.
- (b) To save court time by requiring that discovery be conducted informally between and among the parties before judicial enforcement is requested.
- (c) To save court time in trial and avoid the necessity for frequent interruptions and postponements.
- (d) To protect victims and witnesses from danger, harassment, and undue delay of proceedings.
- (e) To provide that no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or as

mandated by the Constitution of the United States. (Cal. Pen. Code, § 1054.)

As stated in subsection (e) of Penal Code section 1054, this is not the exclusive means of discovery, pursuant to the very language of the statute. This concept is supported by case law that has developed after the enactment of Proposition 115. After this new discovery scheme was enacted it was challenged as being unconstitutional. In addressing this issue, the California Supreme Court stated:

The prosecutor's duties of disclosure under the due process clause are *wholly independent* of any statutory scheme or reciprocal discovery. The due process requirements [of the United States Constitution] are self-executing and need no statutory support to be effective. Such obligations exist whether or not the state has adopted a reciprocal discovery statute. Furthermore, if a statutory discovery scheme exists, these due process requirements operate outside such a scheme. The prosecutor is obligated to disclose such evidence *voluntarily*, whether or not the defendant makes a request for discovery.

No statute can limit the foregoing due process rights of criminal defendants, and the new discovery chapter does not attempt to do so. On the contrary, the new discovery chapter contemplates disclosure *outside* the statutory scheme pursuant to constitutional requirements as enunciated in *Brady, supra*, 373 U.S. 83, and its progeny. Section 1054 expressly provides that the new discovery chapter shall be interpreted to give effect to the provision that "no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or *as mandated by the Constitution of the United States*." (§1054, subd. (e), italics added.) We conclude there is no due process violation because the new discovery chapter does not affect the defendant's constitutional right to disclosure of all exculpatory evidence, in the hands of the prosecution as mandated by the high court in *Brady, supra*, 373 U.S. 83, and its progeny.

(Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3rd. 356 at 378, footnote omitted, italics in original.)

Therefore, the district attorney is required under both the statutory requirements of Penal Code section 1054, et. seq., and the United States Constitution to provide the requested discovery.

II.

AN ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO DISCOVER ALL INFORMATION THAT WILL ASSIST HIM IN THE PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF HIS DEFENSE, INCLUDING MATERIAL EVIDENCING THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO EXERCISE ITS CHARGING DISCRETION.

A. AN ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO DISCOVER ANY MATERIAL THAT MAY ASSIST HIM TO MOUNT A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE.

It is axiomatic that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process of law where the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. (*Brady*, *supra*, 373 U.S. 83, *Bagley*, *supra*, 473 U.S. 667.) However, this axiomatic principle applies even beyond the domains of guilt and punishment when a "defense" consists of claiming a constitutional violation as the basis for a pretrial motion to dismiss, or for other sanctions. (*Murgia v. Municipal Court for the Bakersfield Judicial Dist. Of Kern County* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, See also *People v. Cruz* (1993) 16 Ca4th 322.)

The California Supreme Court decided in *Murgia v. Munipal Court* that a prosecution's alleged "discriminatory enforcement of the laws" was a legally recognized "defense" to a criminal charge, which would allow defendants to seek and obtain discovery relevant to such a claim. In *Murgia*, criminal defendants filed a discovery motion seeking documentary and testimonial evidence from law enforcement officials,

which they alleged, related to their claim of discriminatory prosecution. (*Id.* at 291.) In support of their discovery motion, the defendants submitted numerous affidavits setting forth various incidents of alleged discriminatory conduct by law enforcement, which were aimed against the union that all of the *Murgia* defendants were members of. The defendants cited the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions as bases for their defense of discriminatory prosecution. (*Id.* at 294.)

After the trial court denied defendants' discovery requests because of its mistaken belief that a defense of discriminatory prosecution was unavailable, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Supreme Court. (*Id.* at 290, 293, 306.)

The California Supreme Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying discovery to the defendants. (*Id.* at 306.) In doing so, it relied on precedent by the United States Supreme Court, which it found explicitly allowed a criminal defendant to defend against a criminal prosecution on a claim that the prosecution violated the defendant's Constitutional right to equal protection. (*Id.*) The California Supreme Court concluded that the materiality of the defense of discriminatory prosecution triggered traditional principles of criminal discovery, which entitled defendants to seek discovery relevant to their claim. (*Id.*)

In the wake of *Murgia*, additional case law emerged that addressed the issue of what kind of showing a criminal defendant needed to make in order to obtain discovery in support of a discriminatory prosecution claim based upon an equal protection violation. (*People v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (Baez)* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th

States Supreme court adopted the rule that the Courts of Appeals had been applying, which "require[s] some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense, "discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent". (*U.S. v Armstrong, supra, 517 U.S.* at 468.) The Supreme Court held that a defendant must "produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted but were not..." (*Id.* at 469.) The Court opined that *Armstrong's* holding sufficiently balanced the defendant's interest in avoiding discriminatory prosecution, against the government's interest in vigorous prosecution. (*Id.* at 470.)

Beyond *Murgia* and *Armstrong's* recognition that an equal protection violation is a proper foundation upon which a criminal defendant may build a defense against prosecution, there is a body of jurisprudence identifying additional defenses rooted in other Constitutional rights, which similarly do not involve issues pertaining to the defendant's guilt. Such Constitutional defenses to criminal allegations range from violations of the right to counsel, right to speedy trial, and right to due process of law. (*People v. Coffey* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, *Jones v. Superior Court* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 734, *People v. Archerd* (1970) 3 C3d 615.) Additionally, the longstanding existence of the exclusionary rule as the appropriate sanction for government conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, further exemplifies the legal principle that Constitutional violations often serve as a basis for a

criminal defendant's defense against prosecution. (See e.g. *People v. Williams* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, *Mapp v. Ohio* (1961) 367 U.S. 643.)

In underscoring the power of fundamental rights granted to an accused by the United States Constitution, the California Supreme Court stated,

"While the courts have regularly adopted and enforced legislative interpretation of [a] constitutional provision..., [a] constitutional provision is self-executing. [] The provisions of the Penal Code are merely "supplementary to and a construction of' the Constitution. It is thus unnecessary ..., in asserting [a] constitutional right..., to rely on specific statutory provisions.... (Jones at 738-39 (relying on Harris v. Municipal Court (1930) 209 Cal. 55; People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139).

B. BRANDON HAS THE RIGHT TO DISCOVER WHETHER THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY VIOLATED HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHT WHEN IT DECIDED TO DIRECT-FILE HIS CASE.

Among those fundamental rights granted to an accused in a criminal prosecution is the right to due process of law.

"Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. [The United State Supreme Court] ha[s] long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. To safeguard that right, the Court has developed "what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence."" (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 485 (quoting U.S. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982), 458 U.S. 858, 867.

In addition, "[t]he due process clause of both [the] United States and California Constitutions is a bar to the deprivation of liberty except by the regular administration of the law and in accordance with general rules designed to protect individual rights." (People v. Ventura County Municipal Court (1972) 27 cal.app.3d 193.) When the district attorney makes a decision to prosecute, that decision serves to deprive a person of

their liberty. (See *People v. Tenorio* (1970) 3 cal.3d 89.) Such a decision must therefore comply with fundamental principles of due process of law as guaranteed by the United States and California Constitutions.

Under California law, the district attorney as public prosecutor "...shall attend the courts, and within his or her discretion shall initiate and conduct on behalf of the people all prosecutions of public offenses. (Cal Gov Code §26500 (emphasis added.) This discretionary mandate is also expressly contained in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 with regard to the district attorney's ability to permissively file an accusatory pleading against a minor in a court of criminal jurisdiction. (Welf & Inst Code §707(d)). Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(2) states that, "[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 602, the district attorney...may file an accusatory pleading against a minor 14 years of age or older in a court of criminal jurisidition...". The statute then goes on to enumerate the various circumstances under which a district attorney is required to exercise their discretion in making a determination about whether to file in criminal or juvenile court. (Welf & Inst Code §707(d)(2)(A)-(C).)

The statutory duty imposed upon the district attorney to exercise discretion applies generally to the manner in which they prosecute all public offenses, as well as specifically to those cases in which they must determine whether to file an accusatory pleading against a minor in criminal court. With regard to the latter, such a filing decision clearly and significantly implicates a person's liberty interest, as the decision to file in criminal court exposes an individual to a period of incarceration, while the juvenile

court subjects a minor under its jurisdiction to the rehabilitative remedy of wardship. (See e.g. *Penal Code* §190; See also *Welf & Inst Code* §602, §607, §725(b).) Furthermore, Brandon currently faces a mandatory prison sentence of 53 years to life, whereas if under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court any commitment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Division of Juvenile Justice (formerly the California Youth Authority) must end upon his 25th birthday. Where a decision by a district attorney affecting a criminal defendant's liberty, which statutorily requires the exercise of discretion as an essential legal prerequisite to making such a decision, is made without due consideration given as to whether they will exercise this discretion, that defendant is deprived of their liberty without due process of law.

A prosecution that denies a criminal defendant due process of law is susceptible to a motion to dismiss. (Scherling v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1978) 22 Cal.3d 493.) Like a motion to dismiss based on a claim of discriminatory prosecution for an equal protection violation, a motion to dismiss based upon a prosecutor's abuse of discretion amounting to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, triggers traditional principles of criminal discovery, which thus entitles a defendant to seek discovery relevant to his claim. (See Murgia, supra 15 Cal.3d 286.)

In the instant case, Brandon McInerney is a minor 14 years of age charged in a court of criminal jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(2). By and through his attorneys, Brandon is seeking discovery from the district attorney that is relevant to his claim that in this case they abused their discretion by filing an

accusatory pleading in criminal court, and that in so doing the prosecution denies him of his liberty without due process of law as guaranteed by the United States and California Constitutions. Furthermore, Brandon is seeking this discovery as it relates to his claim that in this case the district attorney abused their discretion by filing an accusatory pleading against him in criminal court, and that this filing decision lacked sufficient consideration by the district attorney regarding whether to invoke the permissive power granted to them in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d)(2), which in turn constitutes a violation of the statute. Finally, Brandon seeks this discovery as it is relevant to his claim that the district attorney violated their duty as set forth in Government Code section 26500, by initiating and conducting a prosecution for a public offense in a manner that exceeds the permissible bounds of their discretion.

The three theories of relevance and materiality articulated above are posited based on numerous statements made by the Ventura County District Attorney's office regarding their prosecution of this case. These statements, taken together, demonstrate a sufficient showing to warrant discovery of the requested materials.

III.

PENAL CODE SECTION 1054.1 OUTLINES SIX TYPES OF DISCOVERY THAT THE PROSECUTION IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL.

Pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.1, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the following items to the defendant. The prosecuting attorney must provide this information if it is either in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney

knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies. (Cal. Pen. Code, § 1054.1.)

The items statutorily mandated to be disclosed are:

- (a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at trial.
 - (b) Statements of all defendants.
- (c) All relevant real evidence seized or obtained as a part of the investigation of the offenses charged.
- (d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial.
 - (e) Any exculpatory evidence.
- (f) Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial, including any reports or statements of experts made in conjunction with the case, including the results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial. (Cal. Pen. Code, § 1054.1.)

Although Penal Code section 1054.1 outlines six specific areas of discovery which the prosecution must provide to the defendant, each of these six areas of discovery have relevant case law which broadens and clarifies the scope of materials to be provided by the prosecution.

IV.

THE COURT MUST ORDER THE PRODUCTION OF APPROPRIATE DISCOVERY WHEN THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY REFUSES OR FAILS TO COMPLY WITH PENAL CODE SECTION 1054, ET. SEQ.

The California Legislature enacted the rules governing the enforcement of discovery in Penal Code section 1054.5. It states:

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- (a) No order requiring discovery shall be made in criminal cases except as provided in this chapter. This chapter shall be the only means by which the defendant may compel the disclosure of production of information from prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement agencies which investigated or prepared the case against the defendant, or any other persons or agencies which the prosecution attorney or investigating agency may have employed to assist them in performing their duties.
- (b) Before a party may seek court enforcement of any of the disclosures required by this chapter, the party shall make an informal request of opposing counsel for the desired materials and information. If within 15 days the opposing counsel fails to provide the material and information requested, the party may seek a court order. Upon a showing that a party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or 1054.3 and upon showing that the moving party complied with the informal discovery procedure provided in this subdivision, a court may make any order necessary to enforce the provision of this chapter, including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order. Further, the court may advise the jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of any untimely disclosure.

(Cal. Pen. Code, §1054.5, emphasis added.)

This section defines the process by which a party to a criminal action is to seek discovery. The requesting party must first submit an informal request to opposing counsel. If that party's request is not complied with, then that party may seek a formal order from the court. Once the moving party, in this case the defendant, demonstrates that Penal Code section 1054.1 has not been complied with, then the "court may make any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter." (Cal. Pen. Code, § 1054.5 (b).)

In this case, Client Name submitted informal discovery requests pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.5. The requests were made to the district attorney on October 28, 2008 (see exhibit "A" attached hereto and incorporated as though fully set forth). The district attorney failed to comply. Brandon McInerney is therefore asking that the court order the production of the requested discovery.

CONCLUSION

Defendant has fulfilled the procedures for obtaining discovery as defined within Penal Code section 1054 et seq. However, the district attorney has failed to comply the discovery procedures as outlined by section 1054 et seq. Pursuant to the foregoing, defendant is entitled to the specific items of discovery which are within the district attorney's possession. Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that the court grant defendant's formal discovery request pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.5.

DATED: December 3, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

Scott S. Wippert Attorney at Law

Robyn B. Bramson Attorney at Law

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11	Attorneys for Brandon McInerney		
12			
13	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA		
14			
15	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	Case No.: 2008005782	
16	CALIFORNIA	Department No.	
17	Plaintiff,		
18	***	DECLARATION OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF FORMAL DISCOVERY	
19	VS.	MOTION.	
	BRANDON MCINERNEY		
20	Defendant		
21	I, Scott Wippert, being duly sworn, depose and say:		
22			
23	1. I am a duly licensed attorney, authorized to practice law in the state of		
24	California.		
25			
26	2. I am the attorney for Brandor	McInerney in the above-entitled action and	
27	as such, I have reviewed and am familiar with the facts of this case.		
28			

- 3. Brandon McInerney is currently charged with a violation of Penal Code section 187, along with multiple enhancements.
- 4. I am informed and believe that an investigation of the charges alleged against Brandon McInerney herein has been made by officers or agents of the Ventura County District Attorney and by other law enforcement agencies.
- 5. I am informed and believe that some of the officers, agents, or agencies have in their possession, under their control, or have easy access to the same the materials and information described in the defendant's motion for formal discovery.
- 6. On October 28, 2008, the United Defense group made an informal request of the district attorney for the requested materials and information. Fifteen (15) days or more have elapsed since this request was made. The district attorney has failed to provide the requested materials. (See: exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated as if fully set forth.)
- 7. The materials and information sought are necessary for the preparation of the defense of this case and are believed to contain favorable evidence, material to the defendant's guilt or punishment, exculpatory evidence, or impeachment evidence.
- 8. The Ventura County District Attorney has made numerous statements to the media about this case, which make a prima facie showing that they abused their discretion in filing Brandon McInerney's case in criminal court.

9. The materials and information sought are within the actual or constructive control of the district attorney, his officers, agents, or law enforcement agencies. These materials are not known to the defendant or counsel, and cannot be examined prior to trial other than by order of this court.

10. It is mandatory that all such materials and information be provided to the defendant in advance of trial so that the defendant may appraise the same; so that the defendant may know in what regard to exercise the constitutional right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; so that the defendant may exercise the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel by having the defendant's attorney in a position to know what witnesses to summon and what evidence to subpoena; so that the defendant may effectively exercise the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; and so that the defendant may have a fair trial under the due process requirements of *Brady v. Maryland* 373 U.S. 83.))

Therefore, I respectfully request that the relief sought by defendant's motion for a discovery order be granted in all respects.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, except as to matters stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

Executed at Studio City, California.

DATED: December 5, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

Scott S. Wippert Attorney at Law

Discovery Motion 12/08/08

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11	Attorneys for Brandon McInerney	
12	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA	
13		
14	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	Case No.: 2008005782
15	CALIFORNIA	Department No.
16	Plaintiff,	
17	vs.	DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY ORDER
18		
19	BRANDON MCINERNEY	
20	Defendant	
21	The defendant's motion for a discovery order having been read and considered and	
22	GOOD CAUSE APPEARING,	
23		
24	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's motion for formal discovery be	
25	GRANTED.	
26		
27	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order is to be continuing through the	
28	completion of the trial so that any items granted that actually or constructively are	

obtained by the Ventura County District Attorney or by his investigators, agents, or agencies, after the initial compliance with this order, shall be made available to defense counsel forthwith.

DATED: December , 2008

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

EXHIBIT A

THE LAW OFFICES OF

UNITED DEFENSE GROUP COUNTY

4181 Sunswept Dr., Suite 100, Studio City, California 91604 (818) 487-7400 Fex Q818) 487-7414 4 9

UNITED DEFENSE GROUP, COM

County of Ventura
Office of the District Attorney
Deputy District Attorney Maeve Fox
800 South Victoria Avenue L #2730
Ventura, CA 93009

RE: People v. Brandon McInerney, Case # 2008005782

Pursuant to Penal Code §§ 1054 & 1054.1 and the California and United States Constitutions, the Defendant requests any and all supplemental discovery, including but not limited to:

- 1. All notes, communications, correspondence, internal memoranda and other material relating to internal standards or guidelines, whether or not previously reduced to writing, used or referenced by the Ventura County District Attorney to determine which cases involving minors to direct file in the Superior Court.
- 2. Any materials related to training given to employees of the Ventura County District Attorney regarding standards for direct filing cases involving minors in the Superior Court.
- 3. All notes, communications, correspondence, internal memoranda and other materials, whether or not previously reduced to writing, relating to the District Attorney's decision to direct file this case in the Superior Court.
- 4. The names and contact information of any and all persons consulted regarding the decision to direct file this case or other cases involving minors in the Superior Court.
- 5. Any notes or summaries of conversations relating to the decision to direct file this case or other cases involving minors in the Superior Court.
- 6. Statistics since March 8, 2000, relating to the percentage of cases involving minors charged with crimes that could potentially be filed in Superior Court, which in fact resulted in a direct filing in the Superior Court.
- 7. Case names and case numbers of all direct-filed cases since March 8, 2000.
- 8. Names and contact information for *all witnesses* the prosecution intends to call at trial.
- 9. All 911 tapes, dispatch tapes, certified copies of dispatch logs and computer printouts of *communications with dispatch*.
- 10. All dispatch tapes, certified copies of dispatch logs and computer printouts of *communications* between responding and investigating officers (i.e. communications between patrol cars).
- 11. All *photographs* including booking photo.
- 12. All *physical evidence* obtained during the investigation of the charged offense(s).
- 13. All tape recorded, written statements and notes relating to:
 - a. All *conversations involving prosecution witnesses* including experts consulted and the results of examinations or tests to be offered at trial.
 - b. All exculpatory information under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.
 - c. All statements of witnesses inconsistent with prior statements made by them.
- 14. The names, phone numbers and addresses of all people known to or contacted by the District Attorney's Office and law enforcement regarding this case.
- 15. All statements made by the defendant(s) prior to, at or since the alleged offense.

- 16. All statements made by all people contacted by the District attorney and law enforcement regarding this case.
- 17. All notes taken by District Attorney investigators and law enforcement during contact with all people contacted regarding this case.
- 18. Records of *arrests and convictions* for all felonies and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude for *all* witnesses *each* party intends to call at trial.
- 19. All police reports relating to records of *arrests and convictions* for all felonies and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude for *all* witnesses *each* party intends to call at trial.
- 20. Records of *arrests and convictions* for all felonies and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude for *all codefendants* charged in this case.
- 21. All police reports relating to records of *arrests and convictions* for all felonies and misdemeanors involving moral turpitude for *all codefendants charged in this case*.
- 22. All arrest/incident reports and/or statements of witnesses the District Attorney intends to introduce as evidence pursuant to California Evidence Codes § 1109, 1108, and 1001.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated courtesy and cooperation in providing all discoveries. If we do not receive the aforementioned materials within fifteen days of this request, we will consider that as a refusal of your statutory and Constitutional duty to comply.

Sincerely,

Scott S. Wippert

Attorney for Brandon McInerney